This piece originally appeared in The Diplomat.
Days before the United States introduced its global system of tariffs, Chinese and Russian officials held a three-day summit in Moscow. Citing a “friends forever, enemies never” principle as the foundation for Sino-Russian relations, the visit appeared aimed at demonstrating alignment against the U.S. But despite claims to the contrary, that partnership has limits, especially when it comes to Arctic trade.
The Trump administration is currently engaged in an effort to reorient post-Cold War trade dynamics. But it’s not the only global power that wants to do so. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long sought to reduce its reliance on shipping through the Malacca Strait, which facilitates 60 percent of China’s imports. During the trade war in Trump’s first term, China increased its exports to a range of markets, including Mexico, Vietnam, and the European Union. In part, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aimed to develop an on-land trade route through Central Asia and into Europe.
The Chinese desire for alternate trade routes stretches farther north. The Northern Sea Route (NSR), which passes through the Bering Strait and Arctic Ocean, was listed as a region for BRI development in 2018. It’s easy to see why. Shipping through the NSR, which is not currently navigable year round because of ice blockage, cuts the distance between Europe and China by 40 percent. Trade usage is expected to skyrocket in the coming years, with one Russian projection estimating a sevenfold increase over 2022 volume by 2030.
