After fifteen years of bipartisan attention, countless executive orders, and tens of billions in appropriated and authorized funding, the United States remains overwhelmingly reliant on China for the critical minerals. In some cases, that reliance has increased. Over that same period, foreign interference in critical mineral supply chains has moved from a hypothetical to a regular occurrence.
China’s willingness to use its supply chains as leverage became undeniable when rare earth exports to Japan were cut in 2010 over competing island claims. America had more than a decade to prepare for the PRC’s first direct controls on exports to the U.S. But when China placed export controls on gallium and germanium in late 2023, the United States effectively had domestic alternatives. When the PRC later limited graphite and antimony exports, prices for both materials spiked and threatened supply chains for a wide range of products, from weapons to EVs. Then, when rare earth restrictions hit in 2025, American manufacturers still couldn’t find alternatives, and in some cases were forced to shut down production. Even after a bilateral agreement to lift those restrictions, firms are still suffering from yttrium and scandium shortage. In comparison, there is no shortage of interest in critical minerals; they seem to be invoked to justify countless public policies or acts of diplomacy. But despite this interest, American supply chains remain tangled up in China, which is increasingly willing to strangle them to achieve concessions. Why?
