Today, I submitted comments to the FCC concerning the review of submarine cable licensing. Click here to download a PDF of the full comment.
Re: Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks; Schedule of Application Fees (OI Docket No. 24-523, MD Docket No. 24-524)
Dear Ms. Dortch:
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this proceeding. Supporting the continued development and security of submarine cable systems, and the activities such systems support, falls squarely within that mission. The United States is the global leader in submarine telecommunications systems, a position which creates economic and security benefits for its citizens, companies, and allies alike. These systems support the free flow of information that supports commercial, strategic, and cultural endeavours domestically and with our allies. Ensuring that we retain this competitive edge is of the utmost importance.
Periodically reviewing and updating regulations related to critical infrastructure is key to ensuring continued investment and security. The Federal Communications Commission plays a critical role in evaluating, licensing, and overseeing submarine cable systems that originate in the United States. Ensuring that domestic and international cables can be built as quickly and securely as possible is a worthwhile goal.
Based on initial comments submitted by interested parties, the FCC should focus its rulemaking on two key objectives. First, the Commission should focus on streamlining the application process for submarine cable system projects, particularly for firms with a history of financing and building these projects to accelerate deployment. Second, the FCC should ensure there is adequate oversight on the security of cable developers, including system inputs and contractors is vital. But the current proposal creates opportunities for duplicative reporting that could exacerbate wait times for projects, increase overall costs, undermine economic and national security. The FCC should instead leverage its new Council on National Security to promote information sharing between the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector (“Team Telecom”), other executive branch stakeholders, and relevant bureaus within the Commission rather than create duplicative reporting requirements.
Streamlining Submarine Cable Licensing
A focus of the Trump administration has been attacking burdensome government regulation. Chairman Carr has similarly focused on removing barriers to innovation through the Delete, Delete, Delete proceeding currently underway at the Commission. With this deregulatory vision in mind, it makes sense to evaluate the current state of regulations for submarine cables and identify areas for improvement. Based on responses received in the initial round of comments, and research on the topic, there is evidence that improvements can and should be done.
One way this can be accomplished is by creating a standardized questionnaire that is used jointly by the FCC and Team Telecom. In the NPRM, the Commission asks about ways to improve the licensing process and areas where both initial licensing and renewals for licenses could be improved or expedited. A standardized questionnaire that can be shared between the FCC and Team Telecom would accomplish this goal and create greater continuity between the two.
Another area of focus should be establishing comprehensive “blacklists” and “whitelists” for vendors based on the FCC’s Covered Entity List. The Commission’s recent move to take stock of the list and ensure compliance is welcome, and could serve a complementary purpose in this proceeding. The Covered List could serve as a form of “blacklist,” where any system that relies on components from firms listed would trigger heightened scrutiny from Team Telecom or lead to a revocation under the FCCs existing authority. On the other hand, the “whitelist” could help firms preparing their applications and planning new projects have certainty over providers and partners who have been vetted and approved by the Commission, ideally speeding up evaluations and minimizing the need to readjust plans during or after licenses are provided. This could be a good opportunity to begin leveraging the Cyber Trust Mark initiative launched by the Commission to secure industrial-grade hardware. Combining FCC authority with expertise from Team Telecom and other relevant agencies to create such lists can help mitigate threats posed by unsecure vendors or entities and cut down on uncertainty for cable operators.
Further, the Commission should consider limiting license requirements to entities that have material operational control over the physical cable system. The NPRM proposes requiring (IRU) and (SLTE) to receive licenses in addition to the entities who control the submarine cable systems. This idea has drawn skepticism from many stakeholders in the filing because of potential regulatory costs, with little evidence that it will create a commensurate gain for security. A better path would be limiting licensure to entities with operational control over the submarine cable systems and requisite landing stations. Specific security concerns should be handled on a case-by-case basis per Team Telecom and Commission assessment, allowing for more targeted assessments of insecurity while not creating additional compliance for systems as a whole.
Council on National Security as a Conduit for Information Sharing
Cable licenses and requisite reporting information helps the Commission and system builders and operators make informed decisions regarding system viability, security, and service. Information sharing throughout the submarine cable licensing process and over the life of the system is a focus throughout the NPRM and comments submitted on the record. Updating and clarifying what kinds of information should be included in applications and the cadence of re-evaluations is a worthy endeavour. Commenters made it clear that rather than creating new, potentially duplicative reporting requirements, a better path forward would be to increase information sharing during the application process and throughout the life of the cable license between the Commission and Team Telecom. This should be the Commission’s primary focus, with the Council on National Security acting as a clearinghouse for information related to cable security and oversight.
The Council should prioritize creating a standardized portal where FCC licensing materials can coexist with required disclosures for Team Telecom. Commenters generally did not object to the NPRM’s proposals related to increased information sharing and more fulsome review of license materials, but did object to duplication of such information and process. A solution to such a problem would be to create a system where information can be made available more quickly and easily through one hub for all information related to submarine cable systems.
To ensure that confidential information is protected and that disclosures can be tailored to the Commission’s focus, the Council on National Security should be responsible for managing the portal and fulfilling requests for specific information. The Council’s ability to work across bureaus at the FCC and coordinate with external partners, including Team Telecom, means it will be in a strong position to evaluate requests and make proper determinations on what information can be shared and with whom it should be shared with.
Beyond creating a hub for information to be shared among the FCC and Team Telecom regarding licenses, the Council should also help create a two-way portal for sharing threat-intelligence information between private and public entities. Submarine cable systems are increasingly under attack from physical and cyber threats. Creating a network of information distribution on current and emerging threats to these systems would help cable operators improve security protocols and anticipate new threats. For government actors, information from the private sector on the nature, frequency, and source of attempted attacks on cable systems can inform future policy changes and updates while also building trust between various stakeholders. Such feedback loops can become the basis for future coordination efforts, and ideally, help keep such critical infrastructure safe and secure.
Conclusion
Submarine cable systems are the backbone of American digital communications, economic activity, and information sharing. Continued investment in these systems is crucial for the continued development and diffusion of cutting-edge technologies throughout the country and around the world. The FCC should be commended for focusing on reviewing and updating the licensing and regulatory requirements related to this vital component of American infrastructure. Any changes to current protocols or future updates should be focused on achieving two goals: streamlining regulatory requirements to accelerate licensing timelines and and improving information sharing between the relevant government stakeholders to increase visibility of potential threats to system security and resilience. Comments and recommendations laid out here and throughout the record can provide guidance on the best way to achieve such goals and ensure that American submarine cable operators and users continue to benefit from this infrastructure.
Sincerely,
Joshua Levine
Research Fellow
Foundation for American Innovation
